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REVIEW ESSAYS
the plurality of american war
John T. Kuehn
Ways of War: American Military History from the Colonial 
Era to the Twenty-First Century, by Matthew S� Muehlbauer 
and David J� Ulbrich. 2nd ed� New York: Routledge, 2017� 516 
pages� $74�95�
Matthew S� Muehlbauer and David J� Ulbrich have produced an admirable text 
built around Russell Weigley’s framework in his now classic American Way of 
War.1 The occasion for this review is the release of an updated, second edition of 
this work� As mentioned, the book clearly seems designed as a text, specifically for 
an upper-level undergraduate course, but possibly 
for graduate-level seminars on American military 
history as well� Accordingly, this review assesses 
the book on the basis of that pedagogical design�
The authors’ study is primarily narrative in na-
ture, but never far from the flow of facts, figures, 
faces, and the occasional military fiasco hangs the 
authors’ overarching thematic argument: there 
is no one American way of war, but rather many 
ways, determined by a complex interaction of 
factors and institutions� They have updated this 
aspect of the book in an expanded introduction 
to the second edition, but its fundamental claim 
remains unchanged (pp� 5–6)� The student or pro-
fessor wanting one-stop shopping for these ways of 
war will be rewarded here�
Dr. John T. Kuehn is a professor of military history 
at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Col-
lege (CGSC). He retired from the U.S. Navy in 2004 
at the rank of commander after twenty-three years 
of service as a naval f light officer. He has taught a 
variety of subjects at CGSC since 2000. He authored 
Agents of Innovation (Naval Institute Press, 2008), 
A Military History of Japan: From the Age of the 
Samurai to the 21st Century (Praeger, 2014), and 
Napoleonic Warfare: The Operational Art of the 
Great Campaigns (Praeger, 2015), and coauthored 
Eyewitness Pacific Theater (Sterling, 2008) with D. 
M. Giangreco. He was awarded a Moncado Prize
from the Society for Military History in 2011. His lat-
est book from the Naval Institute Press is America’s 
First General Staff: A Short History of the Rise and 
Fall of the General Board of the Navy, 1900–1950 
(2017).
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The sheer scope of the text is impressive, yet it does not descend overmuch 
into the weeds of battles and military trivia, instead remaining focused on how 
conflict involving Americans, and not just European Americans, has evolved 
over the years� Nonetheless, the narrative does start—as advertised in the title—
with the mass arrival of “modern” Europeans on the North American continent 
during the sixteenth century� However, that is preceded by cogent contextual 
discussions of native warfare prior to the arrival of the Europeans; the so-called 
military revolution in early modern Europe; and necessary discussions of tactics, 
technology, and logistics� In other words, the authors do a fine job of setting up 
the in-place “initial conditions” for the continuum of conflict that follows� This 
is good news for novices to these debates, since it gives them, up front, an under-
standing of the key definitions and concepts used throughout the text� Another 
welcome discussion is that covering the “levels of war�” All too often Americans, 
and readers and writers of military history specifically, are two-dimensional in 
their thinking about war as just tactics and strategy (pp� 4–5)� The operational 
level of warfare and the higher level of policy beyond military strategy often are 
disregarded in instruction and writing on these matters beyond what one might 
find in esoteric discussions of military doctrine�
As for the narrative itself, in something of such broad scope the biases and 
preferences of the authors are almost inescapable� But they tend to succeed in 
achieving their aim of using the most updated scholarship to avoid perpetuat-
ing the tired myths and unchallenged legends that make up so much of what 
sometimes is called popular American military history� However, no one author, 
or two, can be expected to get it all completely correct, or agreeable, as if such a 
thing is even possible� The purpose of this review is not to catalog all those places 
where the authors’ narrative differs from the reviewer’s interpretation of things, 
especially causation� A larger understanding of history includes such arguments 
about the past, but the purpose of this study is more of an ongoing refinement 
rather than a final word�
However, one minor error that occurs in the last chapter is worth correction� 
The authors claim that the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 
1986 delineated as follows: “The chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS] � � � 
assumed a new position in the operational chain of command: Theater com-
manders reported to the chairman, who then reported to the president” (p� 
468)� Goldwater-Nichols does make the CJCS the “principal military adviser to 
the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense,” but 
under §211 it states: “CHAIN OF COMMAND�—Unless otherwise directed by 
the President, the chain of command to a unified [i�e�, regional or theater] or 
specified combatant command runs—(1) from the President to the Secretary of 
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Defense; and (2) from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the com-
batant command” (emphasis added)�2 In other words, the CJCS is simply the 
principal military adviser, and civilian control over regional or global combatant 
commanders is absolute and does not include the chairman�
That quibble aside, many of the accounts listed here are refreshing in the new 
way in which they cast American conflict, in terms of both its political context, 
owing to foreign and domestic factors, and what has been called the “war and 
society” approach�
Finally, the later chapters in particular might be regarded as the starting point 
for future conversations about events still ongoing and will serve instructors 
and teachers well in engaging their students in debates about more-recent and 
familiar events� The second edition takes the book up to the most recent times of 
President Barack Obama’s second term and, particularly, includes a heavy criti-
cal component of the (still ongoing) so-called Global War on Terror as well as a 
discussion of the impact of the neoconservative movement on the American way 
of war (pp� 478–79, 490–95)� These are welcome additions and fit nicely into the 
overall construct of the book�
Historian N� A� M� Rodger recently wrote about Americans and history as 
follows: “Our problem is not that we know too little history to understand the 
present but that we know too much, and most of it is wrong�”3 Muehlbauer and 
Ulbrich’s effort here goes a long way toward correcting that problem—if only 
more people would read it� Highly recommended for all audiences, not only col-
lege undergraduate and graduate students� 
N O T E S
1� See Russell F� Weigley, The American Way of 
War: A History of United States Military Strat-
egy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana Univ� 
Press, 1973)�
2� Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub� L� No� 
99-433, §§201, 211, 100 Stat� 992, 1005, 1013 
(1986)�
3� N� A� M� Rodger, “The Hattendorf Prize Lec-
ture: The Perils of History,” Naval War College 
Review 66, no� 1 (Winter 2013), p� 8�
NWC_Spring2019Review.indb   106 2/25/19   10:40 AM
3
Kuehn et al.: The Plurality of American War: "Ways of War: American Military Hi
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
